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OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION?
Summary: The basic goal of this paper is to assess, whether the Trans-Pacific Strategic 
Partnership will increase the competitiveness of the Asia-Pacific Region by creating a high-
quality Free Trade Area, having in mind various obstacles characterized in the text. As President 
Barack Obama set a goal of concluding the negotiations of nine parties till November 2011, 
there are doubts whether it is possible to conclude negotiations of an FTA encompassing trade 
in goods and services, rules of origin, technical trade barriers, sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures, IPR, but also government procurement and competition policies in participating 
countries. The need for success may lead to looking for a solution acceptable for all the 
different parties, but of poor quality, basing on the lowest common denominator.
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1. Introduction
On the last APEC summit held in Yokohama in November 2010, President Barack 
Obama suggested setting a target of completing TPP negotiations by the next APEC 
summit scheduled for November 2011 in Honolulu (Hawaii). Setting such an 
ambitious goal for a group of nine negotiating parties is definitely mobilizing all of 
them for intensive work. On the other hand, it may lead to focusing on having any 
agreement instead of high-quality Free Trade Agreement encompassing all the fields 
of FTA, like trade in goods and services, rules of origin, technical trade barriers, 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures, IPR, but also government procurement and 
competition policies in participating countries. The need for success may lead to 
looking for a solution acceptable for all the different parties.
The basic goal of this paper is to assess, whether the Trans-Pacific Strategic 
Partnership (TPP) will increase the competitiveness of the Asia-Pacific region by 
creating a high-quality Free Trade Area (in the sense that it will aim at removing all 
barriers to trade in goods and services). Setting such a goal was quite an easy task 
with original three (Chile, New Zealand, Singapore, or four when Brunei joined) 
members of the TPP. It became difficult, however, when five new countries joined 
(the United States, Australia, Peru, Vietnam, and Malaysia), especially due to the 
PN 191_Faces..._Skulska, Jankowiak.indb   61 2011-11-07   11:34:38
62 Marcin Grabowski
possible U.S. participation. Having in mind various lobbies, specific interests of 
negotiating parties, as well as a dense network of other agreements, we may expect 
at least difficulties in further negotiations and in achieving the goal set by first three 
parties of TPP. Moreover, this agreement may have no added value in reference to 
APEC provisions if all negotiating parties will focus on completing the negotiations 
before APEC summit in Honolulu, instead of initial goals, as it may end up in finding 
the lowest common denominator.
2. Background and basic issues
Regional architecture of the Asia-Pacific is relatively dense, encompassing various 
organizations (no necessarily de jure international organizations), agreements, 
especially connected with different stages of economic integration, and international 
regimes. Among them, the so-called “noodle-bowl” of preferential trade agreements 
seems to be the crucial problem, taming further trade integration. 
The Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (TPP), which was 
conceived by three Pacific countries Singapore, Chile, and New Zealand in 2003 
(Brunei joined in 2005), was supposed to deal with this basic problem of the so- 
-called “noodle-bowl” of preferential trade issues. The TPP came into force in 2006, 
being a high-quality free trade agreement, with comparison to existing ones. The 
TPP is also supposed to deal with “behind-the-border” regulatory issues that other 
preferential trade agreements do not deal with. There is an important risk behind the 
idea, as without careful consideration, design and a manageable framework, it will 
likely do the reverse, excluding key partners and making it difficult for those excluded 
to join, which in result may definitely limit not only the scope of the agreement, but 
also benefits to participating actors.1
Having this endeavor especially without the U.S. would definitely limit its profits 
for members, as the more participants, the bigger benefits.2 Hence, it is important 
1 See P. Drysdale, Are There Real Dangers in the Trans-Pacific Partnership Idea?, http://www.
eastasiaforum.org/2011/04/18/are-there-real-dangers-in-the-trans-pacific-partnership-idea (date of ac-
cess: 5.05.2011).
2 There are important economic benefits of a free trade in a bigger region; hence, integration 
within Asia-Pacific seems definitely more profitable. In an analysis presented by P. Drysdale and J. 
Drake-Brockman impact of trade liberalization on Chinese GDP was shown. Assuming that in the case 
of WTO liberalization, GDP growth would be 100%, integration within APEC would be 61%, within 
ASEAN+3 41%, within +3 (China, Japan, South Korea) 35%, in the case of Greater China (China, 
Hong Kong, Taiwan) 28%, and China and ASEAN just 7%. See J. Drake-Brockman, P. Drysdale, 
History of Regional Economic Integration in East Asia, pp. 2-3, http://www.crawford.anu.edu.au/pdf/
staff/peter_drysdale/mexico.pdf (date of access: 5 May 2011). F. Bergsten estimates that creation of 
the East Asian Free Trade Area would bring looses to U.S. economy of ca. USD 25 bn. annually. It 
was one of the crucial arguments of this economist to support creation of the Free Trade Area of the 
Asia-Pacific (FTAAP). See F. Bergsten, A free trade area of the Asia-Pacific in the wake of the falter-
ing Doha Round: Trade policy alternatives for APEC, [in:] Ch. Morrison, E. Pedrosa (eds.), An APEC 
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to engage more subjects, especially important economic actors of the Asia-Pacific. 
The U.S. may serve as a good example, but we should expect also main U.S. trade 
partners and regional economic partners to join. In March 2008 the United States 
joined the TPP negotiations, followed by Australia, Peru, Vietnam, and Malaysia. 
The U.S. is naturally the most important prospective member of the agreement, 
having already FTAs with Singapore and Chile (members of the TPP), as well as 
prospective members, Australia and Peru.3 
America’s role in the process may be both constructive, and destructive, as it 
is not ready for such commitments as expected by initial members of the TPP. It is 
worth noticing, however, that the agreement is not of heavy weight for the United 
States in terms of trade share of the regional trade. TPP members’ merchandise 
trade with the U.S. accounted to USD 170.9 billion, comparing with total American 
exports and imports combined of USD 3.2 trillion. The TPP accounted for just 5.3% 
of America’s trade, including none of the top 10 of U.S. export markets. Having 
Japan in, the total trade involved rises to USD 351.8 billion, constituting 11% of 
America’s total trade. But most of the growth in Asian and world trade is still outside 
that group – in China, India, and Brazil.4
Having said that, we should now focus on two issues: first is Pacific-wide 
integration, with no exclusions, second dealing with the aforementioned “noodle-
bowl” of trade agreements, but also other regional organizations.
3. Theoretical basis
Analyzing the problem of the Trans-Pacific Strategic Partnership in scope, we 
would expect to have real benefits for the region, it is important to adopt regional 
integration concept and relate it to the Asia-Pacific Region. I would start with Joseph 
Nye’s concept of the integrative potential. He mentioned four conditions, favouring 
integration:5
1) Symmetry or economic equality of units – it is especially important in regional 
integration although if there are core areas for integration, its role may diminish.
2) Complementarity of the elite value – Nye stressed that the higher the level of 
complementarity, the bigger chance the regional grouping will keep its impetus.
Trade Agenda? The Political Economy of a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific, Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies, Singapore 2007, p. 20. Arguments against the creation of the FTAAP, focusing on U.S. 
domestic conditions are to be found in V. Aggarwal, The political economy of a free trade area of the 
Asia-Pacific: A U.S. perspective, [in:] Ch. Morrison, E. Pedrosa (eds.), op. cit., pp. 37-72.
3 See I. Ferguson, B. Vaughn, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, Congressional Research 
Service, Washington, D.C., 2011, p. 1.
4 See P. Drysdale, op. cit. 
5 See J. Nye, Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organization, Little Brown, 
Boston 1971; J. Dougherty, R. Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories of International Relations: A Compre-
hensive Survey, Harper & Row Publishers, New York 1990, pp. 444-445.
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3) Existence of pluralism – thanks to the pluralism, the number of groups 
benefitting from integration increases; hence, they do care about keeping the pace of 
the integration as well as enlarging it to new areas.
4) Capacity of member states to adapt and respond – in this respect the internal 
stability is treated as a crucial factor (the better the authorities manage internal 
problems, the bigger chance they will be able to participate effectively in an 
integrative organization).
Looking briefly at the aforementioned four factors, we may definitely question 
three of them in the case of the Asia-Pacific Region (so the area from which possible 
TPP members come, even if taking into account only nine negotiating parties). 
There is no symmetry or economic equality of units, but we may see integration 
in the region as a way of looking for core areas. Problems with internal stability 
and complementarity of values among participating units are also clearly visible. 
The most important factor for Asia-Pacific integration is, in my opinion, plurality 
of units participating in the process. This factor is particularly visible in the U.S., 
where the position of the federal government is strongly limited by different lobbies. 
The primary force of the Pacific Rim integration is businessmen and consumers 
and we can for sure call it market-driven integration. It is even more visible in the 
case of East Asia, where manufacturing networks are crucial factors of economic 
co-operation. I would also stress other factors, including especially the role of an 
academic community, as well as people-to-people exchanges (migrations, education, 
religious connections, etc.).6
Finally, comparing the integrative potential of East Asia and the Pacific, we 
may use the gravity model of trade, as economic integration seems to be crucial in 
regional integration. We can use this model not only for assessing the potential of 
integration in the area of trade, but also in different areas. The crucial variables for 
this model are GDP and distance between given countries. The basic form of the 






 where Txy is a value of trade (exports and imports) between countries x and y, 
c – constant; GDPx and GDPy – income of the exporting and importing countries; 
Dxy – distance between countries x and y; and finally β1, β2 and f are parameters of the 
gravity equation estimating in research process.7 
6 While dealing with problems of regional integration, it is useful to quote J. Ney’s definition of 
a region, where region is defined as a group of states connected both by geographical links, and a cer-
tain degree of mutual interdependence. See J. Nye, International Regionalism, Little Brown, Boston 
1968, p. vii.
7 Formula quoted from Dongwook Han, Gravity Model and Economic Integration, doctoral dis-
sertation, Michigan State University Department of Economics 1999, pp. 32-33, available at the dis-
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In the case of first four partners of TPP, the gravity model of trade is definitely 
unfavorable, meaning, it shows economic uselessness of such an agreement. If other 
countries join, there are still problems of vast distances and limited share of trade of 
negotiating parties in comparison to the regional trade.
4. The Pacific Region
In a skeptical view (assessing possible creation of wider integration body, based 
on the Asia-Pacific), we should take into consideration the following factors. The 
Asia-Pacific Region is a symbiosis of two concepts: Asia and Pacific, characterized 
by different historical traditions, cultures, levels of development, etc.; and scholars 
are searching for common features that could be a basis for emerging common 
interests and a membership in the Pacific community. This factor does not favour the 
creation of closer Trans-Pacific links. On the other hand, we may think of the region 
in geo-economic categories – relating to the fact that economic links between the 
sub-regions (especially North America – particularly the U.S. and Canada, Oceania 
– predominantly Australia and New Zealand, and East Asia8) result in creation of the 
regional system, which definitely favours regional economic integration, including 
TPP.9
Having in its heart a vast ocean and the crucial states on its peripheries seems 
to be vital for the creation of the core for the integration of the peripheral states. 
Hence, we do not have a situation similar to the European integration (with a French-
sertation database of the George Washington University. We must bear in mind that the pure economic 
variables are not only factors influencing trade, especially looking at the U.S. trade relations. See 
R. Summary, A political-economic model of U.S. bilateral trade, The Review of Economics and Statis-
tics 1989, Vol. 71, No. 1.
8 While looking at Latin American states, we may notice that most of the countries are very loose-
ly integrated to the Asia-Pacific system. Some differences are visible in the case of Mexico, although 
the internal conflicts make it more difficult. See J. Faust, U. Franke, Attempts at diversification: Mexico 
and Pacific Asia, The Pacific Review 2002, Vol. 15, No. 2; M. Solis, S. Katada, The Japan-Mexico FTA: 
A cross-regional step in the path towards Asian Regionalism, Pacific Affairs 2007, Vol. 80, No. 2. To 
observe the basic attempts of creation an inter-regional institution for East-Asian and Latin-American 
co-operation see L. Low, The forum for East Asia-Latin America co-operation (FEALC). Embryonic 
interregionalism, [in:] M. Farrel, B. Hettne, L. van Langenhove (eds.), Global Politics of Regionalism. 
Theory and Practice, Pluto Press, London 2005, pp. 85-93. We should also take into consideration the 
Pacific Islands Forum (co-operating within the SPARTECA Agreement) states from Southern Pacific 
(Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, New 
Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu), but again 
their participation (apart from Australia, New Zealand and the PNG) in Asia-Pacific integration efforts 
seems to be rather negligible. More about their integration activities in G. Hassal, Th. Sampson, Toward 
a New Pacific Regionalism, An Asian Development Bank, Commonwealth Secretariat, Joint Report to 
the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, Manila 2005.
9 See E. Haliżak, Stosunki międzynarodowe w regionie Azji i Pacyfiku, Wydawnictwo Naukowe 
SCHOLAR, Warszawa 1999, pp. 53-54.
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German core) or North American integration (with the U.S. as a core). From the 
economic point of view, we could imagine Japan as a core of the integration (or 
Northeast Asian countries – China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan), but due to political 
and historical obstacles, it is hard to imagine those countries – especially China and 
Japan as a core of the Asia-Pacific integration. On the other hand, the United States 
may be rather perceived as a core for the Western Hemisphere integration; hence, 
we do lack the credible leader.10 It can be a reason for the fact that development of 
TPP is not supported strongly enough by political factors and countries that could 
agree on smaller benefits in the beginning to achieve political goals, which made 
negotiations and easier.
5. Regional architecture
The Asia-Pacific Region encompasses several overlapping and potentially competing 
regional architectures dealing with both economic and strategic aspects. Some of 
them are Asian organizations, other Pacific-wide and TPP will somehow complement 
and somehow compete with those groups. Selected bodies, existing and prospective 
are presented in Table 1, existing or possible FTAs are bolded.
Table 1. Selected regional organizations of the Asia-Pacific Region 
ASEAN 
Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations
1967 Brunei, Burma/Myanmar, Philippines, Indonesia, 




1997 10 ASEAN members countries and the People’s Republic 
of China, Japan, South Korea
EAFTA 
East Asian Free Trade 
Area
PROPOSAL 10 ASEAN members countries and the People’s Republic 
of China, Japan, South Korea
EAS 
East Asia Summit
2005 10 ASEAN members countries and the People’s Republic 
of China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, India, New 





PROPOSAL 10 ASEAN members countries and the People’s 
Republic of China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, India, 
New Zealand
NEARF 
North-East Asia Regional 
Forum
PROPOSAL The People’s Republic of China, Japan, South Korea, 
Russia, the United States (basing on six party talks’ 
participants, excluding North Korea) 
10 See R. Feinberg, Comparing Regional Integration in Non-Identical Twins: APEC and the FTAA, 
Paper presented at the APEC Study Center Consortium Annual Meeting, Brunei, 26-28 May 2000.
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ARF 
ASEAN Regional Forum
1994 Australia, Bangladesh, Burma/Myanmar, Brunei, Chile, 
China, Philippines, India, Indonesia, Japan, Cambodia, 
Canada, South Korea, North Korea, Laos, Malaysia, 
Mongolia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, 
Russia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, the United States, 




1989 Australia, Brunei, Chile, China, Philippines, Hong 
Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Canada, South Korea, Malaysia, 
Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Russia, 
Singapore, the United States, Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam
APC 
Asia Pacific Community
PROPOSAL G-8, G-10 or G-18: G-8: U.S., China, Japan, Russia, 
India, Indonesia, South Korea, Australia, G-10 
aforementioned 8 countries, but ASEAN Troika instead 




1996 27 EU members countries, 10 ASEAN member 
countries, China, India, Japan, South Korea, Mongolia, 
Pakistan, European Commission, ASEAN Secretariat
SAARC 
South Asian Association 
for Regional Co-
operation
1985 Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, 




2001 China, Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, Russia, Tajikistan, 
Uzbekistan
NAFTA 
North American Free 
Trade Agreement
1992 Canada, Mexico, the United States
PIF 
Pacific Islands Forum
1971 Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, 
Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, NZ, Niue, Palau, 
Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, 
Tuvalu, Vanuatu
SPARTECA 
South Pacific Regional 
Trade and Economic Co-
operation Agreement
1981 Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, 
Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, NZ, Niue, Palau, 
Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, 
Tuvalu, Vanuatu
Source: author’s own work.
6. Economic integration of the region
As stated earlier, the Asia-Pacific Region should be perceived as a region especially 
in geo-economic categories. There are five basic areas of regional integration, 
illustrated in Figure 1. It is definitely important that regional integration, including 
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regional integration organizations should deal with all of them eventually. Figure 1 
presents interlinkages of the regional co-operation in different sectors. Illustrating 
graphically crucial spheres of integration and their direct or indirect influence on the 
growth in the region, it focuses on the economic and institutional stability.
figure 1. Regional co-operation in different sectors and their interlinkages
Source: Meeting the Challenges in an Era of Globalization by Strengthening Regional Development 
Cooperation, Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, United Nations, New 
York 2004, p. 26.
Integration in four basic areas – namely: trade, transport, ICT co-operation 
and finance – was analyzed in the report: Meeting the Challenges in an Era of 
Globalization by Strengthening Regional Development Co-operation prepared by 
the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific,11 and 
the report Progress of Regional Co-operation and Integration in Asia and the Pacific 
made by the Asian Development Bank. They focus on the following problems: trade 
and investment, co-operation in monetary and financial issues, managing of the 
regional public goods, cross-border infrastructure.12
11 See Meeting the Challenges in an Era of Globalization by Strengthening Regional Development 
Co-operation, Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, United Nations, New York 
2004, pp. 41-126.
12 See Progress of Regional Co-operation and Integration in Asia and the Pacific, The Boao Fo-
rum for Asia and Asian Development Bank, Manila 2007, pp. 9-62. 
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As Trans-Pacific Economic Partnership deals mostly with trade and investment 
issues, this area will be discussed here. In trade and investment area we should 
focus on:
1) harmonization of the so-called “noodle-bowl” of regional trade agreements 
(bi-, mini-, multilateral, FTAs, PTAs, as different rules of origins are definitely an 
impediment for regional trade) – making them consistent with the WTO rules would 
give the highest benefits to the region;13
2) creation of an East Asian FTA (or a wider agreement – FTAAP – Free Trade 
Area of the Asia-Pacific, basing on TPP, if only “high-quality” agreement will be 
achieved), as co-operation in a hub-and-spoke system (with ASEAN, China, India as 
a hub) will probably limit the integration;14
3) products standard harmonization, service trade and the development of the 
intellectual property rights protection system;15
4) increasing co-operation in trade facilitation, trans-border trade and regional 
investment agreements to fully benefit from the growing trade potential;
5) the need for gradual liberalization of the labour force flows – this problem 
seems to be especially difficult due to the immense gaps in the levels of economic 
development of those countries.16
Most of the aforementioned issues are a part of the initial TPP agreement, 
encompassing trade in goods, rules of origin, customs procedures, trade remedies, 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures, technical barriers to trade, competition policy, 
intellectual property, government procurement, trade in services, temporary entry, 
and transparency.17 We may observe, however, that additional countries that have 
joined negotiations since 2008 make the process much more difficult, which can lead 
to poor-quality FTA, even if negotiated. 
Figure 2 illustrates the biggest problem of the trade and investment integration 
of the region, namely the “noodle-bowl” of regional agreements. The consequence 
of the integration driven by governments acting for both political-strategic and 
economic issues is a succession of poor quality agreements, towards which the 
business community has been largely indifferent. Usage rates of Asia’s PTAs are
13 The current state of regional trade agreements is illustrated in Figure 2.
14 See Z. Fan, Preferential Trade Agreements in Asia: Alternative Scenarios of “Hub and Spoke”, 
ERD Working Paper, No. 83, Asian Development Bank, Manila 2006.
15 See R. Agarwala, B. Prakash, Regional Co-operation in Asia. Long-term Progress, Recent Ret-
rogression, and the Way Forward, ERD Working Paper Series, No. 28, Asian Development Bank, 
Manila 2002, pp. 19-20.
16 Ibidem, pp. 20-21.
17 See Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement, http://www.mfat.govt.nz/down-
loads/trade-agreement/transpacific/main-agreement.pdf (date of access: 5.05.2011). Basic provisions 
are described in Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (Trans-Pacific SEP), Media 
Info-Note, http://www.fta.gov.sg/tpfta/media+infokit+on+ trans-pacific+sep+_31may05_.pdf (date of 
access: 5.05.2011).
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figure 2. Free trade agreements, negotiations, and discussions by selected East Asian  
and other nations, 201018
Source: D. Nanto, East Asian Regional Architecture. New Economic and Security Arrangements and 
U.S. Policy, Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C., 2010, p. 12.
18 a) China also has FTAs with Hong Kong, Macao, and New Zealand. Partial FTA with Chile; 
negotiations with Pakistan, the Southern Africa Customs Union, the Gulf Cooperation Council, Iceland, 
Norway, and Costa Rica, and discussions with India. b) Japan also has FTAs with Mexico, Chile, 
Switzerland, and Brunei; negotiations with India and Peru; and discussions with Canada and Mongolia. 
c) S. Korea also has FTAs with Chile, EFTA, India, U.S. (unratified), and EU (unratified) and nego-
tiations with Canada, Japan, Mexico, Peru, Australia, and New Zealand. d) Taiwan or Chinese Taipei 
also has FTAs with Panama, Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Honduras and is negotiating with 
the Dominican Republic. e) ASEAN also has an FTA with India. f) Singapore also has FTAs with 
India, EFTA, Jordan, Panama, Peru, the Gulf Co-operation Council, is a member of the Trans-Pacific 
Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement with Brunei, Chile, and New Zealand in which Australia, 
Peru, Vietnam and the United States are negotiating to join. Singapore is in negotiations with Mexico, 
Canada, Pakistan, Costa Rica, Ukraine, and the European Union. g) Indonesia also has an FTA with 
India waiting approval and is in discussions with Egypt. h) Thailand also has an FTA with Bahrain, 
a partial FTA with India, is a member of The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical 
and Economic Cooperation, or BIMSTEC, which groups together Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burma, India, 
Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Thailand and aims for an FTA by 2017, negotiations with Peru, Chile, EFTA, and 
Papua New Guinea and discussions with the EU. i) Malaysia also has an FTA with Chile and Brunei, 
negotiations with New Zealand, and discussions with India. j) Philippines also has an FTA with EFTA 
and is in discussions with Chile and Israel. k) Vietnam has an FTA with the Andean Community and 
negotiations with New Zealand, EFTA, and the UAE. It also is joining the negotiations on a Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP FTA) including Singapore, Chile, New Zealand, Brunei, Australia, Peru, and 
the United States. l) Australia also has an FTA with the United States, with the Pacific Island Countries 
Trade Agreement (14 members), Chile, is negotiating with China, the Gulf Co-operation Council, Ja-
pan, S. Korea, and the TPP. m) New Zealand also is a member of the TPP and is negotiating with the 
Gulf Cooperation Council, Hong Kong, S. Korea, and India. See D. Nanto, East Asian Regional Archi-
tecture: New Economic and Security Arrangements and U.S. Policy, Congressional Research Service, 
Washington, D.C., 2010, p. 12.
PN 191_Faces..._Skulska, Jankowiak.indb   70 2011-11-07   11:34:39
Will Trans-Pacific Strategic Partnership Agreement… 71
unfortunately low, both in absolute terms and in comparison to those for such 
agreements in other parts of the world.19 
Creation of an FTA overcoming and ordering this “noodle-bowl” would be for 
sure an asset for the whole region and a basis for broader regional integration in other 
aforementioned spheres. Such an FTA will unfortunately meet many obstacles.
7. Conclusions
The idea of a high-quality Free Trade Area in the Asia-Pacific is definitely 
brilliant, having in mind the problem of overlapping organizations, and especially 
preferential trade agreements in the region on the one hand, and growing economic 
interdependence on the other. There are important challenges for such an idea, briefly 
described in the text:
1) huge differentiation of the Asia-Pacific Region, which makes integration 
much more difficult in the light of Nye’s theory;
2) problems with treating Asia-Pacific as a region in the light of regionalism 
theories;
3) weak partners (initial), still small scale of trade and vast distances, making 
economic integration less beneficial, using gravity model of trade;
4) a bunch of competing organizations, even having in mind only the most 
important ones (presented in Table 1);
5) the problem of commitments constituting the “noodle-bowl” of preferential 
trade agreements of the region;
6) difficulties of making contributions by the crucial economic powers of the 
region (either negotiating, like the U.S., or necessary in the future, like China or 
Japan).
Even having in mind the aforementioned obstacles, we may expect negotiations 
will be concluded before APEC summit in November 2011, but there is a serious risk 
of having poor-quality FTA between nine parties, being simultaneously engaged in 
a bunch of other preferential agreements. In such a case, the TPP will probably not 
increase the competitiveness of the region in a significant degree. There is a chance, 
however, the process will be a stepping stone for creating the high quality Free 
Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific, as well as integration in other spheres depicted in 
Figure 1.
19 See J. Ravenhill, Can the TPP Resolve the ‘Noodle-Bowl’ Problem, http://www.eastasiaforum.
org /2009/11/26/can-the-tpp-resolve-the-noodle-bowl-problem (date of access: 5.05.2011).
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CzY POROzUMIENIE O STRATEGICzNYM PARTNERSTWIE 
TRANSPACYFICzNYM (TPP) 
PODNIESIE KONKURENCYJNOść REGIONU AzJI I PACYFIKU?
Streszczenie: Głównym celem niniejszego artykułu jest ocena, czy Porozumienie o Strate-
gicznym Partnerstwie Transpacyficznym poprawi konkurencyjność regionu Azji i Pacyfiku 
poprzez utworzenie wysokiej jakości strefy wolnego handlu (usuwającej wszystkie bariery 
dla handlu), biorąc pod uwagę różne przeszkody opisane w tekście. Prezydent Barack Obama 
postawił za cel zakończenie negocjacji dziewięciu stron do listopada 2011, ale pojawiają 
się wątpliwości, czy jest możliwe zakończenie negocjacji FTA, obejmującej handel dobra-
mi i usługami, reguły pochodzenia, techniczne bariery dla handlu, ograniczenia sanitarne 
i fitosanitarne, prawa własności intelektualnej, a nawet zamówienia rządowe, czy politykę 
konkurencji stron. Potrzeba sukcesu może skłaniać do szukania rozwiązania akceptowalnego 
dla wszystkich stron, ale w oparciu o najmniejszy wspólny mianownik.
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